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The Case for Continuation of Mandatory Independent Audits 
For Publicly Held Companies 
John C. Burton 
Securities and Exchange Commission* 
When I was asked to speak on this topic I w i l l have to admit that I did 
not initially view it as a hot one. Nevertheless, it did seem desirable to look 
once again at the somewhat strange phenomenon called an audit by an inde-
pendent public accountant to see whether or not the conventional wisdom which 
asserts its necessity is justified. 
H o w M u c h Independence? 
The first question to be considered is whether or not, in fact, we want 
totally independent audits. Here I think the answer is probably no. Independence 
does not necessarily lead to assurance, and absolute independence, which would 
require elimination of all dependence on communication with clients, would 
be bad news indeed. The ultimate independent audit would be where the 
auditor arrives on the scene, is handed the financial statements and the books, 
and talks wi th no one within the company. I think we could agree that such 
an audit would very likely be a rather bad one since an audit depends on candid 
communication between auditor and client i n order for the auditor to develop 
the necessary thorough knowledge of the company and its business which he 
must combine with a knowledge of the accounting measurement model. 
What we do want, therefore, instead of absolute independence is a dis-
passionate unbiased professional review of financial statements. In addition, 
we expect auditors to be proficient in the measurement and communication of 
financial information, and to assist their clients as necessary to insure adequate 
reporting to the public. 
Parties at Interest 
As indicated above, an audit is a rather strange creature and not at all the 
way i n which it is perceived by most outsiders. In an overwhelming majority 
of cases, the audit is essentially a cooperative effort because the interests of 
management, the auditor, and the public coincide. In these engagements the 
*The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility 
for any private publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those 
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's 
colleagues on the staff of the Commission. 
117 
auditor has as his principal responsibility a review of the adequacy of financial 
information systems of the firms with emphasis on the needs of the outside 
investor. In this review, the auditor should also be aware of the information 
needs of management and, as necessary, make appropriate recommendations to 
improve management's control of operations. The auditor's role then is twofold 
—attestation and consultation. The auditor uses his professional skills and ab-
sence of bias to bear public witness to the reliability of financial information 
included i n an annual report to shareholders and to work with management 
to improve the usefulness of the financial information system for both external 
and internal reporting purposes. 
It is worth noting that in a cooperative audit engagement even a bad audit 
does not have a very high social cost because when the financial statements 
prepared by the client do present fairly the results of operations, an audit de-
ficiency w i l l not result in misleading data being given to the public. It may be 
that total stockholder information falls a bit short of what it could be and that 
the audit fee is largely wasted, but these are minor compared to the potentially 
major costs that way arise if deficient audits coexist with managements who 
are trying to obscure the reality of their operation. 
Whi le an audit is normally a cooperative effort, perhaps 5% of the time 
adversary conditions arise. These are situations i n which the interests of man-
agement and the public are diverse, where there are benefits to management 
from a process of reporting other than the full and fair results of operations. 
These are the tough audits, where the auditor more than earns his fee and has 
trouble collecting it. In these circumstances the auditor has the principal role 
of arbitration between the interests of management and the public, and i n such 
cases he must always remember that he serves the public first. H e must avoid 
the situation in which the public perceives it has been cheated as a consequence 
of deficient financial reporting because abuses of this sort carry a very high cost. 
Economic Considerations 
After considering the nature of the audit, we must next test its economic 
utility. In this connection the cost of audits of public companies in the United 
States is not difficult to measure. It has been estimated to be between $750 
mil l ion and a billion dollars per annum. This is not a small figure and the 
question that must be answered is whether the value to society justifies the cost. 
The benefits from audit services, however, are harder to quantify. A s a 
starting point there are the benefits of improved financial information systems 
which result from the auditor's review and suggestions. For most companies 
the auditor also contributes to improved external financial reporting procedures 
and results; presumably he improves the communication process between man-
agement and investors. Finally, the auditor contributes significantly to the 
avoidance of abuse and, as previously indicated, the cost of abuse is very high. 
This service helps keep the company out of trouble, protects the board of 
directors, and builds the confidence of investors. 
Confidence is a key to good markets. Analysts and other investors must be 
confident that the numbers on which they base their investment decisions are 
realistic within the framework of the accounting model or they w i l l be reduced 
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to a feeling of being a part of a random process without knowing what is being 
done to them. 
In the final analysis, the weighing of costs and benefits must represent a 
subjective judgment. The number of independent audits was growing prior to 
the Securities Acts and it can therefore be inferred that, at least for many 
companies, a hard-nosed market judgment justified the cost of an audit. I 
believe this case is stronger today than it was at that time, but since there is no 
definitive evidence or answer, one must have Faith—as I do. 
Should There be Change? 
If we agree that the principle of audits is a worthwhile one, we should 
explore next the question of whether or not things should be done differently. 
A number of suggestions have been made that perhaps there is a better alterna-
tive to the current approach of having independent accountants perform the 
audit function. Some have suggested that this should be a role for Government. 
Although i n my current position I have developed a respect for the role of 
Government i n the market place, I am not convinced this is the right answer. 
Government audits might be cheaper. I believe, however, that they would not 
be as creative, nor would they be as effective i n avoiding abuses. A Government 
audit almost by its very nature is an adversary audit and the record of adversary 
audits in catching abuses is not very good. Such an audit discourages coopera-
tion, which is still the key to most audits. Whi le the auditors of the Internal 
Revenue Service, the Defense Contract Audi t Agency, and the General Account-
ing Office achieve many successes, their overall record also shows the major 
difficulties which arise when the auditee is steadfastly trying to avoid working 
with the auditor. I believe, therefore, that Congress was wise i n rejecting the 
idea of Government audits of companies offering their securities in the public 
market place. 
Another possibility is to create an audit function within the corporation. 
The Audi t Committee of the Board of Directors or some other internal source 
might supervise an internally performed function. I think, however, that it is 
apparent that not only would such auditors tend to lack breadth of expertise 
which comes to independent public accountants through experience with many 
companies, but this approach would also be defective i n those cases where man-
agement had reason for advocacy—at the bottom 5% of the cases where the 
auditor is most tested. This leaves us then with independent accountants, who 
I think can justify the faith which has been placed i n them. 
If we mutually agree that things should not be done differently, we should 
then consider the question of who should select the auditor. There have been 
numerous suggestions that if an outside party such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission or the N e w Y o r k Stock Exchange were to select auditors they 
would not be so dependent upon the economic market place, and would be able 
to be more independent and less subject to the pressures of management. Once 
again, however, we can get to the question of whether the cost i n terms of lack 
of cooperation i n such audits would be greater than the benefits created by the 
lack of relationship. I am not persuaded that the benefits of such a system 
outweigh the very substantial problems that coexist with it. 
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Final ly, there are questions raised as to who should pay for audits. Many 
of those suggesting that auditors be appointed by outside agencies also suggest 
some pooling of resources to pay audit fees. They suggest a N e w York Stock 
Exchange fee or some other device by which a pool of funds w i l l be generated. 
Whi le this again has some appeal, since the economic relationship between the 
auditor and his clients is one of the principal problems of outward appearance 
that exists, I am doubtful that it would be an improvement. The discipline of 
the market place is still beneficial i n the audit world, and an auditor who did 
not have a responsibility to his client to do a good job i n economic terms might 
well tend to over-audit. W e should not encourage a steady increase i n pro-
cedures simply because money is available. W h i l e there are problems with the 
current fee arrangements, I think that they represent as good a solution as any 
that have currently been proposed. 
Increasing Auditors' Rights 
If we are to continue to operate within the current broad framework then 
we must determine what changes might be made to improve the quality of audit 
work and avoid perceived problems. In the first place, a number of things can 
be done to increase auditors' rights. Whi le I would hesitate to suggest tenure, it 
would seem that a longer period of appointment might be beneficial. It is well 
known that during the first year of an audit, auditors generally absorb some 
significant nonrecurring costs. If the auditor could be assured of three, four 
or five years of audit relationships some economic pressures that might otherwise 
exist could be avoided. 
Secondly, auditors should be given the right to attend meetings of the 
board of directors and stockholders of corporations. Corporate policy is set at 
directors' meetings and if the auditor is to be fully apprised of what is going 
on and if his services are to be most productively used, his attendance at such 
meetings would be beneficial. Stockholders' meetings are generally attended by 
auditors today and the availability of the auditor to answer stockholders' ques-
tions, as well as to make a statement i f necessary, seems desirable. 
T h i r d , there should be increasing pressure for mandatory audit committees 
comprised of board members to whom the auditor w i l l have a direct channel 
of communication. This is not only a protection to the board but also an im-
portant right for the auditor since he is able to deal with members of the board 
on a continuing institutionalized basis. 
Fourth, it might be desirable to permit the auditor to communicate directly 
to the shareholders whenever he feels it is necessary for h i m to do so. Whi le 
such communications would be infrequent, it seems an appropriate lightning 
rod and device by which auditors could encourage greater corporate disclosure 
when they felt it was necessary. Such a right might be implemented by a change 
i n the SEC's proxy rules to require management to make a section i n the proxy 
statement available to the auditor to enable h i m to make any statement to the 
stockholders which he feels necessary under the circumstances. 
Finally, the auditor should have certain rights i n regard to the disclosure 
of his dismissal. Our 8-K requirements currently represent a significant step 
forward in this regard, but it may be that they should be extended to require 
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disclosure i n a proxy statement or annual report any time an auditor is changed. 
In addition, it might be that some public notice of auditor change should be 
required of any corporation beyond the simple 8-K requirement to report the 
hir ing of a new auditor. 
Some Accompanying Added Obligations 
If auditors are to have more rights as I recommend, they should also recog-
nize additional obligations. In this regard I believe that there is a need for 
increased use of the attest function. Auditors should be prepared, for example, 
to attest i n some fashion to a company's internal control system and perhaps to 
forecasts or projections. 
In addition, the concept of auditor of public record needs development. 
Under this concept, the auditor has a continuing responsibility to review all 
public communications to investors and shareholders on a timely basis—not 
with the objective of performing an audit on interim and other data but to 
provide assurance that audited financial results are not being misused in press 
releases and annual reports and to be certain that accounting and measurement 
problems have been adequately aired prior to the publication of interim reports 
and other announcements. It is apparent that substantial work must be done i n 
the development of standards in this area but the concept seems to be one which 
is growing i n acceptance. 
Evolutionary, Not Revolutionary Change 
In the final analysis then, this re-examination of the role of the auditor has 
not created a cry for revolutionary change. Rather, I believe that evolution of 
the auditor's role is essential and that the opportunities are very great for in-
creased social service and function by the public accounting profession. Such 
increased opportunities should result both i n increased revenues and increased 
responsibilities. As we see the tremendous growth i n accounting enrollments 
i n schools of business today, we can perhaps take pleasure in the fact that stu-
dents are voting with their careers for a broader accounting function. If the 
profession avoids the paralysis which fear of liability can bring it and is prepared 
to see its role evolve, then both the public and the profession w i l l be well served. 
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